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Smith: Judges--Disqualificationn to Act Because of Stock Interest

JUDGES -

DISQUALIFICATION TO ACT

BECAUSE OF STOCK INTEREST
I.

INTRODUCTION AND GENERALBACKGROUND

Aliquis non debet esse judew in,
propnia causa.1
Disqualification to adjudicate a cause rests on this ancient
maxim that no man should sit as a judge in his own case. At
common law a judge was disqualified only for a direct pecuniary
interest. 2 Bracton tried unsuccessfully to incorporate into English law the view that a mere suspicion of an interest by a party
was a basis for disqualification. 3 Coke, however, by reference to
cases involving the judge's pocketbook, first set the standard for
his time in his injunction that "no man shall be a judge in his
own case." 4 Since someone must hear a case which is properly
before the court, there is a balancing view of necessity which
dictates that a judge should not be disqualified if at all possible.
Notwithstanding the necessity doctrine, the disqualification rule
existed at common law, was adopted by English jurists, and has
been accepted by the American courts. The ultimate purpose of
such a rule has been and is to further the best interests of justice
by preserving the integrity and the impartiality of the courts
and the respect and the confidence of the people for their decisions.6
The purpose of this article is to focus on the disqualification
of a judge because of a stock interest, which is a small facet of
1. See Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE LJ.605 (1947), quoting

from: Co. Lir. *141a.
2. 46 Am. JuR. 2d Judges § 94 (1969) states that at common law the judge
could not be challenged in the proceeding itself, but that he was expected to
exercise sound discretion in refraining from trying cases involving circumstances which might cast doubt or suspicion on the fairness of the court.

3. See Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947), quoting
from: 4 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUMrUDImNNus ANGLIAE (Woodbine's
ed. 1942) 281.
4. Id. at 610, quoting from Co. LiTr. *141a.
5. See generally PoLLOcK, FIRST Boox OF JURISPRUDENCE 270 (6th ed.
1929); 29 HARV. L. R v. 103 (1915); 42 MIcH. L. Rxv. 1127 (1944); Annot.,
39 A.L.R. 1476 (1925) (all dealing with the doctrine of necessity).

6. Carr v. Dubme, 167 Ind. 76, 78 N.E. 322 (1906) ; accord, V'ren v. Bagley, 118 Or. 77, 245 P. 1074 (1926); Leonard v. Willcox, 101 Vt 195, 142 A.
762 (1928).
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the disqualification rule, but one of current public interest.7
Other than a South Carolina statute concerning disqualification
because of relationship to the parties,8 the only guide for disqualification of a judge in this state is that portion of the South
Carolina Constitution which provides:
No judge shall preside at the trial of any cause in the
event of which he may be interested,or when either of
the parties shall be connected with him by affinity, or
consanguinity, within such degrees as may be prescribed
by law ....9
Since there are no South Carolina cases which interpret the
word "interest," decisions from other jurisdictions with similar
statutory language will be examined to aid in ascertaining what
constitutes a disqualifying stock interest within the meaning of
the above constitutional provision. Such examination, first, will
suggest basic guidelines for interpretation of the constitutional
provision by the state judiciary, and second, will suggest whether
further legislative action, by amendment or statute, is necessary
to define what the term, "interest," encompasses as that term
relates to a stock interest. For purpose of discussion decisions
from other jurisdictions may usefully be divided into two
groups: those which adhere to a strict interpretation of the word,
"interest," and make disqualification the general rule where the
issue is raised; and those which espouse a ZiberaZ interpretation
of the term and thus make disqualification the exception to the
general rule.
II

DISQUALXFIOATIOw

BEcAUSE OF STocK INTEREST

A. Strict Interpretation
In PahZ v. Whitt,1" the Texas court announced what might be
termed a strict interpretation of a constitutional provision which
states that "[N]o judge shall sit in any case where he may be
interested ... ,. 11 The case was initiated by appellants for them7. The current and continuing controversy over both judicial and legislative
ethics at the national and at the state level prompted the original inquiry into
this subject. See n.51 infra.
8. S. C. CODE ANN. § 15-10 (1962) provides:
No judge or other judicial officer shall preside on the trial of any
cause when he may be connected with either of the parties by
consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree.
9. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 6 (emphasis added).
10. 304 S.W2d 250 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1957).
11. V-xaON's AxN. ST. CoN T. art. V, § 11 (1876) (cited by the court).
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selves and every member of the cooperative, of which the judge
was a member, to recover money that the cooperative had expended in defense of certain libel suits brought against directors
of the cooperative as individuals. Pah held that a stockholder in
a corporation is disqualified to sit as judge in a case wherein the
corporation is a party. Even though the court could have
stopped with that statement, the court further evidenced its
strict view of the cited language by stating that, although the
judge is the proper one to pass on disqualification, the constitutional provision in question does not allow him much discretion
in determining what amounts to a disqualifying interest. Whatever benefits might be gained from the pending litigation would
inure to the benefit of the trial judge. Although the judge was
only one of 5,000 members of the cooperative, the court construed
the word, "interest," to be absolute and refused to delve into the
degree of interest.
The trial judge had stated before the trial that he was a
member of the cooperative, but felt that he could try the case
with fairness and impartiality. The attorneys, therefore, agreed
to waive any disqualification if there were in fact grounds for
sucl, The court seized, nevertheless, upon the words, "may be
interested," and concluded that a judge should be disqualified
where there is any doubt about an interest. The court found,
moreover, that there was no provision for waiver of disqualification. As the Pah case demonstrated, under the strict view there
is very little room for interpretation. Since there is no need to
delve into degrees of interest, or to consider a waiver of disqualification, the Texas court appeared to have no problem with
the constitutional language which is almost identical to that of
South Carolina's constitution.
In State ex rel. Central Farmers' Trwust Co. v. Chillingworth12
the court disqualified the trial judge pursuant to its strict construction of the Florida statute. 1 3 The suit was against an insolvent bank to foreclose a trust deed. The bank owned a $500
bond secured by the trust deed. The judge was a creditor of the
bank and was a minority stockholder in a corporation that was
a debtor and creditor of the bank. Even though the judge knew
nothing of the bank's ownership of the bond until after both
the creditor-debtor relationships had ceased to exist, the totality
12. 107 Fla. 747, 143 So. 249 (1932).
13. REv. GEN. ST. § 2525 (Fla. 1920) [Presently F.S.A. § 38.02 (1961)]
which in its older version read: "[O]r is interested in the result thereof. .. "
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of these facts made the judge "interested" in the foreclosure
action. The court conceded that it was interpreting the word,
"interest," but like the Texas court, it declared that there was
little room for interpretation in determining what amounts to
a disqualifying interest. The court stated:
The terms of the statute are clear and unequivocal,
permitting no exception or modification. Any other interpretation placed on it than the one here applied
would open the way for endless qualifications never
intended by its enactment and would doubtless result in
many cases of a defect of the administration of justice. 14
In another case,15 the Florida court refused to delve into the
degree of interest and held that a judge owning a majority of
stock in a corporation which owned shares of stock in the receiver bank was deemed disqualified to determine the rights of
that bank. The determination would necessarily affect the value
of bank stock, and, in turn, the value of the corporation stock
held by the judge. Even though the degree in which the value
would be affected was very small, degree of interest was held to
be immaterial.
Similar language in a California statue1 6 was construed in
Adams v. Minor' 7 where the court held that a judge who owned
stock in a bank, intervening in a proceeding before him involving the validity of bonds owned by the bank, was an "interested" party and was disqualified to sit. The fact that the
trial judge, believing he was not disqualified, sat throughout the
trial with the consent and at the request of the attorneys was
immaterial to the question of disqualification under the statutory
language. The fact that the judge had disposed of his stock
pending a decision similarly did not remove his disqualification
to render a decision, because disqualification attaches once the
cause is submitted to the judge for decision. This court also
followed the strict doctrine of no waiver of disqualification even
though the parties agreed that the judge should hear the case
even if there were grounds for disqualification. Strict construe14. State ex rel. Central Farmers' Trust Co. v. Chillingworth, 107 Fla. 747,
--,143 So. 294, 295 (1932).
15. State ex rel. First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chillingworth, 95 Fla.
699, 116 So. 633 (1928).
16. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 170 [Presently WEST'S ANN. CAL. CODE § 170
(1954)] which in its older version states:
No justice, judge . . . shall sit or act as such in action or proceeding: (1) To which he is a party or in which he is interested....
17. 121 Cal. 372, 53 P. 815 (1898).
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tion was evidenced by the court's statement that it could not
consider the amount or remoteness of the stock interest. Because
interest affects different people in different ways and because
it is impossible to draw an accurate line as to what constitutes
a disqualifying stock interest, the court refused to go into the
degree of interest.
The California court in Vallejo 'v. Supeior Court'8 held the
judge disqualified in a condemnation proceeding brought by the
city of Vallejo to condemn certain land for a reservoir. The
Bank of Napa, a banking corporation, was the owner and holder
of a deed of trust pertaining to the property sought to be condemned. The judge was a stockholder in and director of the
Bank of Napa, which had a proprietary interest in the determination as a creditor, and would have been entitled to have any
condemnation award applied to its claim. In finding that the
knowledge of the parties of the judge's interest did not amount
to a waiver, the court, in following its strict construction of the
statute, quoted from the New York case of Oakley v. Aspinwall 9
which stated:
But where no jurisdiction exists by law it cannot be
conferred by consent-especially against the prohibitions of a law, which was not designed merely for the
protection of the party to a suit, but for the general
20
interest of justice.
Placing added emphasis on the need for confidence and respect
for judicial decisions, the court said: "[T]he judiciary shall
enjoy an elevated rank in the estimation of mankind." 21 It made
no difference to this court that the party's interest was small,
because the decisions are for the protection of the public interest
as well as of the parties.
In Tatum v. Southem Pacific C0.22 and Central Pacific Railway Co. b. Superior Court2 3 the courts were acting pursuant to
statutory language which was much more definitive than the
word "interest". The pertinent language in the statute construed
in these two cases provided:
No justice or judge shall sit or act as such in any action
or proceeding:
18. 199 Cal. 408, 249 P. 1084 (1926).
19. Id. at 415, 249 P. at 1086 citing 3 N.Y. 547 (date unknown).

20. Vallejo v. Superior Ct, 199 Cal. 408, 415, 249 P. 1084, 1086 (1926).

21. Id. at 415, 249 P. at 1086.
22. 250 Cal. App. 2d 40, 58 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1967).
23. 211 Cal. 706, 296 P. 883 (1931).
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2. In which he is interested as a holder or owner of
any capital stock of a corporation, or of2 4any bond, note
or other security issued by a corporation.
Tatum held that, even though the judge was a mere holder of
corporate stock as trustee of a testamentary trust, his judgment
in favor of the corporate defendant on the issue of liability in a
personal injury case should be vacated. This court found it immaterial that neither the judge nor the parties were aware that
the corpus of the trust contained stock of the corporate party,
and that the judge's interest as trustee probably would not be
affected by the outcome of the case. The court pointed out that
no consideration of awareness, or knowledge of interest, is
mentioned in the statute. The statute was construed so as to
fulfill the object of guarding the impartiality of judges and of
insuring public confidence in judicial decisions. Although the
decision could have had very little effect on the judge's interest,
the court found that the statute was cast in absolute form and
that public confidence must be preserved by a strict construction
of the phrase, "in which he is interested .... -s2
Although the language in the California Code is explicit as to
what amounts to a disqualifying stock interest, and thus, apparently conducive to a strict interpretation, the California court
in Central Pacific Railway Co. v. Superior Court26 reported
what seems to be a somewhat liberal interpretation. The majority did delve into the degree of interest required to disqualify
under the statute and decided that a judge was not disqualified
where he was a stockholder in one corporation which in turn
owned practically all the stock of a second corporation which
was a party before the court. As might be anticipated, the dissenting opinion criticized this holding, stating that the interpretation was too narrow and that the interest involved was a disqualifying interest.
The New York courts have likewise strictly interpreted the
New York statute, 27 and have held that a judge was disqualified
where he was a stockholder in a corporation instituting an action
24. WEST'S ANN. CAL. CODE § 170 (1954).
25. Tatum v. Southern Pac. Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 40, 58 Cal. Rptr. 238
(1967).
26. 211 Cal. 706, 296 P. 883 (1931). See Goodspeed v. Great Western
Power Co,, 65 P.2d 1342 (1937) ; Cohn v. Superior Ct., 57 P.2d 186 (1936).
27. N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS, ch. 30, § 15 (1909) provides:

A judge shall not sit as such in, or take part in the decision of, a
cause or matter ... in which he is interested.
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in the county court, and that consent of the parties could not
confer jurisdiction upon him to try the case.28 It is interesting
to note that the New York legislature has now provided for a
waiver of disqualification by statute which states:
A judge shall not sit as such in, or take any part in the
decision of, an action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding to which he is a party, . . . or in which he is interested, ....
No justice shall be deemed disqualified
from passing upon any litigation before him because of
his ownership of shares of stock or other securities of a
corporate litigant, provided, that the parties, by their
attorneys, in writing, or in open court upon the record,
29
waive any claim as to disqualification of the judge.
Thus the New York and California courts have meritoriously
responded to the interpretation problem by enacting statutes
which spell out some of the aspects of the judge's stock interest.
B. LiberaZ Interpretation
Other jurisdictions interpreting the word, "interest," favor
the necessity doctrine that a judge shall act if at all possible.
As might be anticipated, such jurisdictions espouse a liberal
construction of the term, "interest," and disqualification of
judges is difficult.
The Georgia court in Beas~ey v. Burt30 found that an interest
was present, but, following its liberal inclination, the court held
the judge not disqualified because of his remote interest. In an
application for a charter by a new bank, the judge's wife owned
an interest in stock of an existing bank which was not a party to
the suit, and the only possible interest which the existing bank
had in the case was the loss of business which it might suffer
through legitimate competition if the proposed new bank was
established. 31 This court was quite willing to delve into the
degree of a judge's interest, whereas strict construction jurisdictions generally disqualify a judge once they find that there
may be any interest.
In Adams 'v. Overland-Madison (a., 3 2 the Georgia court held
28. Queens-Nassau Mortgage Co. v. Graham, 157 App. Div. 489, 142 N.Y.S.
589 (1913).
29. N.Y. JuDicARY LAw § 14 (1968).

30. 201 Ga. 144, 39 S.E.2d 51 (1946).

31. Id. at 149, 39 S.E.2d at 53.

32. 27 Ga. App. 531, 109 S.E. 413 (1921).
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that, according to statute,38 the fact that the judge was one of
the original applicants for a charter is not sufficient to show
that he was a stockholder at the time when the case was tried.
Quite unlike the courts which have been classified in the strict
construction category, the Georgia court was willing to find a
waiver of disqualification even though the statute makes no mention of such waiver. The waiver is implied by proceeding with
the trial without objection by either party.3 4
The statutory language of various states having been discussed, it is advantageous at this point to consider the applicable
federal statutory language in this area. The pertinent federal
statute 6 before it was amended might well have been construed
to be in the strict interpretation category. It is necessary to note
the older version of the statute in order to ascertain the significance of the language as amended.
In the case, In re Honolulu Oonsolidated Oil Co.,36 the United
States government, as a part of a unitary scheme or plan of
litigation, brought a series of suits against various oil companies
to acquire possession of oil land and damages for the value of
oil or minerals previously extracted therefrom. The judge owned
stock in one of the oil companies and was disqualified to sit by
the court of appeals. The judge had suggested his disqualification by disclosure of his ownership of stock, and the parties had
waived it, but the circuit court said that the only question was
whether the judge was in "any way concerned in interest in the
,, 7
pending suit ....
The federal statute has now been amended to read:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial
interest ... as to render it improper, in his opinion, for
him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding
therein.38
In construing the above language the court in United States
33. GA. Acrs 1880-1 p. 58 [Presently
provides:

GA. CODE AN.

§ 24-102 (1958)]

No judge or justice of any court . . . shall sit in any cause or
proceeding in which he is pecuniarily interested ...
34. Adams v. Overland-Madison Co., 27 Ga. App. 531, 109 S.E. 413 (1921).

35. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1965) before amendment read: "[Cloncerned in interest
in any suit." This language was changed in the 80th Congress House Report

No. 308.
36. 243 F. 348 (9th Cir. 1917).
37. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).

38. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1965)

(emphasis added).
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Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lawrenson 9 held that the judge was
not disqualified where he had at one time owned stock in a
corporation presently interested in the litigation pending before
him since he had disposed of such stock prior to the commencement of the litigation. The interpretation given by this court
indicates that the disqualification is left to the conscience of the
40
judge.
Although the courts in the strict interpretation group refused
to go into the degree of interest once an interest was found to be
present, the construction of the federal statutory language 41 in
Lampert v. Hollis Music, Inw.42 has resulted in a judge's not
being disqualified where he owned twenty shares of common
stock of a corporation with almost fourteen million outstanding
shares. In the Lampert case the court distinguishes between the
present statutory language, "substantial interest," and the older
language, "any interest." There is no concrete rule as a guide as
to what constitutes a "substantial interest," and each court must
therefore interpret the term on a case by case basis. 43 Under
South Carolina's present statutory language, it might be argued
that it is not proper to delve into degree of interest, because the
word, "interest" does not have any qualifying adjective, such as
"substantial," as in the federal statute.
The interpretation of the federal statute has also reached the
end of the liberal spectrum in that waiver is permitted even
where there is a "substantial interest" as long as the judge decides within his own conscience that it is a proper case for him
to hear. In the Lampert case a letter from the attorney requesting the judge to act was construed as a waiver. Disqualification
is waived under the federal statute if not made the basis of a
timely motion, 44 and even where there are affidavits attacking
the qualification of the judge, the decision must be left to the
45
informed discretion of the individual district judge.
C. Judici EtAics
The standards of conduct for members of the courts are
spelled out in the Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted by the
39. 344 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1964).

40. United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1965); MacNeil Bros. Co.
v. Cohen, 264 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1959); Voltman v. United Fruit Co., 147
F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1945).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1965).
42. 105 F.Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).

43. Id.

44. Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962).
45. Wolfson v. Palniere, 396 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968).
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American Bar Association in 1923.46 There are several Canons
of Judicial Ethics 47 which might bear upon the topic of discus-

tion, but three are especially applicable in connection with disqualification for interest.
Canon No. 25 states:
A judge should avoid giving ground for any reasonable
suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of his
office to persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute, either to the success of private business ventures,
or to charitable enterprizes ....

48

Canon No. 26 states:
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprizes which are apt to be involved in
litigation in the court; and, after his accession to the
Bench, he should not retain such investments previously
made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to
dispose of them without serious loss. 49
Canon No. 29 states:
A judge should abstain from performing or taking part
in any judicial act in which his personal interests are
involved. If he has personal litigation in the court of
which he is judge, he need not resign his judgeship on
that account, but he should, of course, refrain from any
judicial act in such a controversy. 0
Although these Canons of Judicial Ethics set up guidelines for
judges, they are not applicable to the judiciary of South Carolina as this state has never adopted them; and even if adopted,
it appears there are no means of enforcement. 51 The Supreme
Court of South Carolina apparently does not have any authority
to discipline any judge as there is no provision in the rules of
46. A.B.A. CANoNs OF JuDrCAL ETHICS (1923).
47. See, e.g., A.B.A. CANONS OF JuDIcIAL ETHIcs (1923):

No. 2. Courts exist to promote justice, and thus to serve the public interest.
No. 4. A judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety;
and the appearance of impropriety; he shall avoid infractions of
law; and his personal behavior, not only upon the Bench and in
the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach.
48. A.B.A. CANONS OF JuDicrAL ETmcs, No. 25 (1923).

49. Id. No. 26.

50. Id. No. 29.

51. Wickenberg, Ethics and S.C. Judges, The State (Columbia), Dec. 7,
1969, § B, at 1, Col. 1-3.
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the court or in the law books for disciplining a judge for misbehavior or incompetence short of impeachment by the legislature.5

2

South Carolina could begin its step forward by adopting

the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and by providing authority and
procedural means for policing the rules. The parties and their
attorneys should have the means to challenge a judge's qualification; the public and anyone interested should also have an
opportunity to register complaints with an investigative committee.
Bernard G. Segal, president of the American Bar Association,
has appointed a panel of nine, chairmaned by former Chief
Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court, to
formulate a comprehensive new code of ethics to replace the
forty-six year old Canons of Judicial Ethics. Segal stated:
"[P]ublic confidence in the courts rests heavily upon
the reliance of the people in the integrity of the judge.
The canons must be clear and unequivocal to members
of the judiciary and the public alike, and they must call
for the high standards of fidelity and performance
citizens expect of their judges."58
IM.

CoqcLwsioi

Two fundamental policies exist in the field of disqualification.
All courts want justice, but if disqualification of judges is too
strict, both the cost and the delay of justice increase because the
case is postponed or another judge is brought in to hear it. If
disqualification is too liberal and judges with substantial stock
interests are allowed to sit, cases may, however, be decided with
less delay, but unfairly. South Carolina could best approach
these policies by following a balanced interpretation of "interest"
rather than either the liberal or the strict interpretation. It
would be advantageous to have a strong disqualification rule
with provisions for consideration of degree of interest and
waiver in the proper circumstances. Some positive action is
needed in this area to maintain the public confidence in our
judicial system. As an immediate step, it has been suggested that
South Carolina adopt the present Canons of Judicial Ethics of
the American Bar Association and provide adequate means to see
that they are enforced. South Carolina should also be prepared
to consider the new canons when they are compiled.
52. Id.

53. 14 Aj1mIcAx BAR

NEws, No. 10 (October, 1969).
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Presently, the only requirement for the judiciary of this state
is that they not sit on a case in which they have an "interest,"
but the lack of any specific statutes relating to stock interest
should not permit the judiciary to dismiss the idea of disqualification because of such interest. Judges still have a duty to
disqualify themselves when they are "interested." Disqualification is discretionary in South Carolina, but with an absence of
the needed guidelines, this discretion must not be allowed to
cease to function if the public's confidence in judicial decisions is
to be maintained. It is not suggested that a judge limit his
financial speculations; rather, the suggestion is that there be
alert recognition of situations which might warrant disqualification. Although judges possess human frailties, justice in its
highest form is expected from members of the judiciary. This is
an era of judicial scrutiny, and it is imperative to the quality of
our judicial system that the scrutiny result in a finding that
fundamental to American jurisprudence, even now, is the unblemished maxim:
AZiquis non debet esse judeiv in propri causa.
CODY W. SMTH, JR.
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